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Wage Inequality, Returns to Education and Gender Premia in MENA  
I. Introduction 
Despite their common cultural and historical legacy, the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) countries have diverse characteristics in such key areas as the structures 
of the economies, level of development, and type of governance and institutions. Yet the 
past two decades have been periods of considerable socioeconomic change in most 
countries in the MENA region, characterized by adoption of economic liberalization 
policies and a declining role of the state which traditionally acted as employer of first and 
last resort. This chapter examines some key equity issues emanating from this transition 
in the region’s labour markets. In particular, the chapter will focus on changes in the 
distribution of returns to education, gender wage premia and overall wage inequality in 
MENA during this period.    
 A detailed analysis of wage inequality, and returns to education centers on two 
countries; Egypt and Morocco. The choice to focus our research on a comparison 
between those two countries emanated from both practical and conceptual grounds. Not 
only are there relatively rich data sets for those two countries, but also the comparison 
between them can be quite informative for conceptual reasons. Both countries had some 
form of guarantee of public sector employment for their graduates,
1
 but stand at two 
extremes in terms of problems in their educational systems. Egypt is praised for now 
                                                 
1
 Although in Morocco the scheme was not as formalized and comprehensive as in Egypt, 
nor indeed did it have the same devastating impact on educational expansion and labor 
market outcomes. 
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approaching universal primary school enrollment
2
 and closing the gender gap on that 
count, but criticized for over-investing in low quality secondary and tertiary education, 
whereas Morocco is seen to be one of only three countries in the region (the other two 
being Saudi Arabia and Yemen) where access to primary schools remains problematic; 
especially for girls (Van Eeghen, 2003; Megahid, 2004). It would be interesting to 
examine how these differing patterns impacted gender wage differentials and labour 
market rewards to education.   
For both countries, we formally test the hypothesis that a reduction in the role of 
the public sector as employer of secondary and university school graduates in MENA led 
to falling returns to education over time and lower returns in the private sector compared 
to the public sector. This will be accomplished by estimating selectivity corrected returns 
to different levels of education, from which a crude estimate of the private rate of return 
is calculated. As only private rates of return to education are calculated in this paper, we 
will henceforth refer to those as simply 'returns to education'. 
 However, a reduction in educational premia does not necessarily mean that wage 
inequality is reduced. Wage inequality along other dimensions, such as gender, skill, 
region, and occupation, may in fact increase as public sector wage-setting rules become 
less salient (World Bank, 2004). Thus a second set of questions that will be examined in 
this paper relates to whether there has been a widening in wage differentials, particularly 
along gender lines since the early 1990s in both countries. 
                                                 
2
 Although still with high drop out rates and illiteracy rates that reached 45 percent  
(UNICEF, 2005). 
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  The analysis in this chapter will draw on data from two relatively rich household 
level labour force surveys recently conducted for each county. For Egypt, we use a 1998 
nationally representative household survey, Egyptian Labor Market Survey (ELMS) and 
a comparable survey carried out a decade earlier, Labour Force Sample Survey (LFSS) of 
1988. For Morocco, we use the Morocco Living Standard Measurement Studies 
(MLSMS) of 1990/1991 and 1998/1999. 
 The rest of the chapter will be organized as follows: Section II presents an 
overview of the state of wage inequality in MENA during the last 25 years, focusing on 
MENA status amongst world regions. Section III discusses the estimation methodology, 
data and results of examining the impact of public sector retrenchments on returns to 
education, wage differentials and wage inequality in Egypt and Morocco. Finally Section 
IV concludes by summarizing the empirical findings and drawing some implications.  
 
II. Wage Inequality in MENA Since the 1970's 
In a recent survey of inequality trends in the MENA region over the past three 
decades Adams and Page (2001) indicated that although the MENA region had one of the 
highest rates of income inequality in the world in 1970 (Gini = 0.440), it had recorded 
tremendous improvement since. Together with South Asia, the MENA region is the only 
developing region to record improvements in income inequality over the past three 
decades.  As a result, MENA, by the end of 1990s, had one of the most equal income 
distributions in the world with an estimated Gini coefficient of (0.360).  Another 
distinguishing feature of the region is the fact that it has a high share of income accruing 
to the bottom quantile of its distribution, and this share has increased significantly over 
time. The mean income of the bottom quantile rose rapidly between 1975-1979 and 1985-
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1989. It then declined during the succeeding ten years and recovered at the end of the 
period. These trends are slightly different in East Asia, for example, where the mean 
income of the lowest quantile rose continuously until the economic crisis of the 
1997/1998 and then fell. That is, the increase in incomes of the poorest is less rapid in 
East Asia compared to MENA, but it was sustained for longer. However, in Latin 
America the mean income of the poorest quantile declined continuously from 1980s 
onwards. 
The pattern of income growth accruing to the poorest quantile in MENA reported 
earlier closely paralleled the region’s economic performance and the trend in real wages 
over the three decades. During the period of rapid growth, the poor benefited from both 
income growth as well as an increasing share of income accruing to the bottom quantile 
group. These income and distribution gains for the poor did not appear to have been 
reversed during the region’s economic downturn after 1985 (Adams & Page, 2001; Ali 
and  Elbadawi , 2002).  
The more egalitarian income distribution in the MENA region are a result of a 
number of factors. The post-colonial political ideologies, which dictated the redistribution 
of assets, including agricultural land and public employment helped promote more equal 
income distribution.  Additionally, the area experienced a rapid growth in aid flows 
associated with redistribution of oil rents, which helped to finance both public 
investments as well as commodity based subsidies, in oil rich countries; and workers 
remittances in labor rich countries.  
In order to examine how much of this income inequality is generated due to 
processes in the labor market itself, Figure 1 compares a Theil measure of wage 
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inequality for different regions of the World over the past three decades, based on a data 
base compiled by UNIDO (2002). 
Figure (1): The UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality Theil Measure: 1965-1997-
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 Source: UNIDO, 2002.  
 
The UNIDO wage inequality Theil measure exhibits an S shape trend in all 
regions, but with different break points. Between 1965 and 1985, the MENA, Sub 
Saharan Africa and South Asia regions experienced a decline in their wage inequality 
measure. This period was followed by a sharp rise in wage inequality between 1985 and 
1990. The trend then stabilized over the 1990s to start declining towards the end of the 
decade. However, the story in Latin America is slightly different. Wage inequality started 
to rise in 1980, stabilized between 1985 and 1995 and started to decline thereafter.  
 
Yet, by the 1990s, the MENA region has started to show the highest wage 
inequality levels compared to other regions. While South Asia, as a region, remains to 
exhibit the least variable trends in wage inequality.  It is important to note, however, that 
the high level and sharp rise in the Theil wage inequality measure in the MENA region in 
the 1990s is largely emanating from trends in oil-exporting countries, especially Kuwait, 
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where the measure shot up in the mid 1980s, compared to a decade earlier (see Table 1 
and Figure 2 below).  If we exclude the oil-exporting countries from the MENA sample, 
the measure becomes much lower, and in the 1990s, the MENA average remains well 
below Sub-Saharan Africa, although still above Latin America and South Asia averages. 
This is consistent with the picture of low overall income inequality in MENA compared 
to other regions in the world reported in the Adams and Page (2001) study quoted above.
3
 
 Observing the wage inequality data for three separate groups
4
 of MENA 
countries reveal a consistent trend. Wage inequality declined steadily between 1965 and 
1985, then rose again till 1995 only to decline thereafter. These results conform with the 
general trend reported around the world. However, although the three groups of countries 
exhibit similar trends, the measure is much higher in oil exporting economies, compared 
to the diversified economies group.   
                                                 
3 Adams and Page (2001) also exclude the oil-exporting countries from their MENA 
sample, but they measure overall income inequality using the Gini coefficient. By 
contrast, as mentioned earlier, the UNIDO data is restricted  to manufacturing wages (and 
not total income) and is based on a Theil t-statistic inequality measure. Moreover, some 
differences in measured inequality are also expected due to the difference in the measures 
used.  While the Gini coefficient is relatively sensitive to changes in the middle of the 
distribution—around the mode, Theil index tends to be  more sensitive to changes at the 
lower end of the distribution. 
4
 The diversified economies include: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia; The 
mixed oil economies include, Algeria, Iran and Iraq;  The oil exporting countries are 
Kuwait, Libya and Qatar. Other MENA countries are not covered because of lack of data.   
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Figure (2): The UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure for a sample of 
MENA countries: 1965 - 1997 
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Source: UNIDO, 2002.  
 
 
 
It should be noted that the figures above hide a lot of variation that exists between 
countries. As data in Table 1 reveals, the lowest recorded inequality in 1995 was in 
Algeria (0.02) compared to (0.05) in Jordan, (0.070) in Egypt and Morocco and a high of 
(0.34 and 0.43) in Kuwait and Qatar respectively. 
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Table (1): The UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure for a sample of 
MENA countries: 1965 - 1995 
  1965 1975 1985 1995 
          
Mixed oil Producers average 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Algeria 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Iran, I.R. of 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.03 
Iraq 0.05 0.03 0.02   
          
Diversified economies average 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.10 
Egypt 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.07 
Syria 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.19 
Jordan 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.05 
Morocco 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.07 
Tunisia 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.13 
          
Oil exporters average  0.11 0.11 0.22 0.38 
Kuwait 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.34 
Libya  0.11 0.01     
Qatar      0.28 0.43 
MENA Average 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.11 
Source: UNIDO, 2002.  
 
III . The Evolution of Gender Differentials and Returns to Education  
A. Gender and Sector Differences in Returns to Education  
Between 1970 and early 1990s, MENA countries witnessed its greatest increase in 
literacy rates and primary and secondary school enrollment, though gender gap still 
persistent. Though enrollment rates may appear high, drop out ratios are increasing, 
especially for rural girls.  For most MENA countries, low female enrollment in schools is 
a reflection of the low priority poor families, mostly rural residents, put on girl’s 
education, accompanied by low school quality and lack of transportation and inadequate 
school facilities. Older females are constraints by customary traditions of early marriage, 
childbearing, and household chores.  
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An important element of the labor market is the wage remuneration to different 
levels of education, i.e. returns to schooling. Theoretically, returns to education rise with 
the level of education, regardless of gender or region. Nevertheless, wages in MENA 
follow different directions.   
It is relatively well-established in the literature that public sector wage settings 
generally and in MENA in particular, are based on governmental decrees that rewards 
seniority and years of experience, and tends to be more equal than wage setting in the 
private sector.  It is also well-known that public sector wage-setting rules place a great 
deal of emphasis on formal educational credentials as the main bases of wage differences 
among workers, a phenomenon known as 'credentialism'.  With a reduction in the role of 
the State as employer of first and last resort, we would expect wages to increasingly 
follow a free market remuneration of wages, i.e. reflecting true productivity differences 
among workers. If educational discrepancies reflect productivity disparity, and if the 
public sector has a tendency towards wage reduction, we would expect returns to 
education to be higher in the private than in the public sector, and generally rising over 
time as the role of the latter intensifies.  If, on the other hand, educational credentials do 
not necessarily explain productivity differences, but nevertheless highly rewarded in the 
public sector due to credentialism in wage setting, a reduction in the role of the public 
sector will lead to lower returns in the private sector and falling returns over time.   
Given that the region's educational systems have accommodated for years to the 
needs of growing civil service, the second situation is much more likely in MENA.  
However, a reduction in educational premia does not necessarily mean that wage 
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inequality is reduced, wage inequality along gender, as well as skill, region, occupation 
may in fact increase as public sector wage setting role becomes less salient.  
B. Detailed Analysis of Egyptian and Moroccan data  
Microeconometric studies on returns to education and gender wage differentials 
are few in MENA, due to the scarcity of data, and most highlighted differences between 
public and private sectors. The availability of rich datasets in the late 1990s facilitated 
some preliminary analyses for Turkey (see Tansel, 1994, 1999a and 1999b) and Egypt 
(see Assaad , 1997, Said 2002,  2003 and 2004 and El-Hamidi , 2004).  
In this chapter we conduct a more detailed study of educational choice and 
earning determination in Egypt and Morocco, based on the same estimation techniques 
that correct for selectivity bias, in order to arrive at strictly comparable estimates of 
returns to education, wage inequality and gender differentials for the two countries. The 
estimation model used is described in the following section. 
B. 1 Estimation Methodology 
In the traditional, (Mincer, 1974) specification, returns to education are estimated 
as follows: 
 
LnW = 0 + 1EDU + 2EXP + 3EXP2 + u      
 
Where EDU is the number of years of schooling, EXP is experience in years, 
EXP
2 
is experience squared, and u is a random disturbance term. The specification is 
shown logarithmically in order for the regressors to be interpreted in terms of marginal 
effects. In this way index β is interpreted as the rate of returns to schooling.  
Griliches (1977), however, pointed out that the coefficient estimates of the OLS 
estimation of the classical model could suffer from self-selection bias. If educational 
attainment of an individual is partially determined by his/her abilities and family 
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backgrounds, estimating the previous classical earnings function without taking into 
account the possibility that family background and ability might influence educational 
attainment, could give biased results. One approach to reduce the bias is to include 
control variables that might capture part of the unobserved components in the error term 
such as family background characteristics: Father and mother level of education and 
father’s occupation. An interaction term between education and family background can 
capture the effect of family background on returns to education.  
These results, however, are still subject to another type of selection bias. When 
estimating the wage equation, only those who reported wages at the time of the survey 
are entered into the analysis. In order to solve the problem of sample selection bias, 
Heckman (1979) suggests estimating two equations. First the participation equation is 
estimated, for the purpose of this study a logit model is estimated (using the entire 
sample: workers and non-workers). From the logit results, a selection variable (the 
inverse Mills ratio term) is created. This estimate is used in the second step, as an 
additional regressor in the wage equation, yielding consistent estimates of the coefficients 
free of censoring bias. 
A recent extension to this model is to capture the so-called ―certification effect‖ 
or ―sheep skin effect‖. The idea is that an employer might value a worker with a 
certificate more than a worker without one. For this reason, and to allow for estimated 
rate of return to vary by level of schooling, dummies for different levels of education are 
used instead of years of schooling.  
 
The modified Mincerian earnings function is: 
 
LnW = 0 + ∑kE.Dumik + 2EXP + 3EXP
2
 + ∑j Reg. Dumij+ 4 +u (1) 
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Where E.Dum are dummies for levels of education, experience, experience  
squared, regional dummy and the selection term. 
 
In this specification, the private rate of return to the k
th 
level of education is estimated by 
the following formula: 
rk = (k - k-1)/ nk         (2) 
where k is the coefficient of a specific level of education, k-1 is the coefficient of the 
previous level of education, and n is the difference in years of schooling between K and 
K-1. (Psacharopoulos, 1981). For the purpose of this study, only results of the private 
rates of returns will be reported
5
.  
 
In order to ascertain whether changes in returns to education translated into 
altering overall wage inequality in the Egyptian and Moroccan labor markets, we further 
study wage differentials along two lines: public-private, and male- female. We 
decompose earnings’ gap into components attributable to pure pay discrimination within 
sectors as opposed to differences in characteristics.   
 
The overall wage differential between public and private (or males and females) 
workers can be decomposed into different components: (1) a portion due to differences in 
average characteristics, such as experience, region and education. (2) a portion due to 
                                                 
5 Contact the authors for comprehensive results including selectivity corrected logit 
estimates and returns to education. 
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differences in the parameters of the wage function, caused by labor market discrimination 
and other omitted factors, and (3) a portion due to differences in selectivity bias. 
Adopting the methodology, which was first utilized by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973) and following the approach employed by Reimers (1983), which uses an 
unweighted average of each type of worker’s coefficients, the wage differential can be 
decomposed as:  
  Wln Wln   fm  )()((5.0)((5.0 ffmmfm f m ffm f m         )X  X   X   )X  X 


  
(3) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) is the differences in the 
endowments of wage-determining characteristics (X’s) between the male and female 
workers, evaluated according to the male pay structure ( m

). This portion can also be 
interpreted as the wage gain females would experience if they had the same 
characteristics on the average as males. The second term on the right-hand side is the 
portion due to differences in pay structure (coefficients, s'

) between males and females. 
It is the wage gain females would experience, given their mean characteristics, if they 
were compensated as males. The last term represents the wage differential attributed to 
sample selection bias.   
 
B. 2 Data 
The empirical analysis is based on the 1988 and 1998 Egypt Labor Force Sample 
Surveys (LFSS), which are both nationally representative household surveys covering 
10,000 households in1988 and 5000 households in 1998;  as well as The Morocco Living 
Standard Measurement Studies (MLSMS) of 1990/1991 and 1998/1999, covering 3349 
households in 1990/91, and 5129 households in 1998/1999. Both surveys include 
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extensive data on employment characteristics such as status, economic activity, duration 
of unemployment, occupation …etc.  
Variables that capture endowments that are used in this study include: level of 
education (illiterate, read and write, primary, preparatory, secondary and university and 
above), age, experience, experience squared, regional dummies (rural vs. urban), parental 
education
6
, hourly wages (in logs), and number of children in the household (one dummy 
for those less than 6 years of age; and a dummy for those greater than six years of age). 
The analysis is restricted to non-agriculture workers,
7
 who are sons or daughters of the 
household heads between the ages of 15 and 64, and not currently enrolled in school. 
Table (A-1) in the appendix displays means and standard deviations for variables.   
 
B. 3 Estimation Results 
Figures (A-1) through (A-4) in the Appendix show earning distribution of real 
monthly wages by quantile for Egypt 1988 and 1998 and for Morocco 1991 and 1999. 
The same figures display the share of total wage workers in each quantile. For example, 
for Egypt, in 1988, about 44% of all employees earned a little over 500 LE per month. In 
1998, 45% of workers earned a little over 400 LE. A drop of 25% in real wages. Public 
sector workers felt the same drop in real wages between 1988 and 1998. Private sector 
                                                 
6 There were cases with few observations on Mother’s level of education, therefore, and 
for the purpose of this comparative study, we opted to use one dummy that takes the 
value zero for illiterate mothers and 1 for literate mothers. 
7
 High rates of seasonal employment within the agriculture sector are justification for 
excluding them from the analysis. 
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workers on the other hand witnessed the largest drop in their real wages (50%). 
Moroccan workers were in a better shape than the Egyptians. The real wages of about 
50% of Moroccan workers dropped by only 20% between 1991 and 1999. Real wages of 
Public sector workers dropped by 12% whereas private sector workers suffered a mere 
3% of a reduction in their real wages. 
In calculating rates of return to education, we assume that the illiterates have zero 
years of education, those who can read and write have 3 years of education, primary 
education encompasses 6 years of education, preparatory education achieves 9 years of 
education, secondary certificates requires 12 years of education, and university education 
graduate achieves 16 years of education. 
 Table (2) shows that in Egypt, the period 1988 to 1998 was indeed a decade of 
wage compression.
8
 With the exception of private sector females (whose coefficients 
were insignificant any way), almost all private rates of returns to education for males 
working in either the public or private sectors have dropped between 1988 and 1998.  
Thus, a public sector male with a university degree earned 6.9% more than a public 
sector worker with a secondary certificate in 1988, but only 5.5% more in 1998 (a 
difference of 1.5%). Private sector workers with comparable degrees noticed a drop of 
3.9% in their relative returns to education. Females were not in a better position either. 
Again, returns to university education compared to secondary certificates dropped for 
public sector females by 1.4 percentage points.  
                                                 
8 This finding is consistent with the main conclusion reported in previous research (Said, 
1992) using the same data , but not correcting for self-selection bias. 
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Table (2): % Differences in Rates of Return to Education By Sector of Employment, Egypt,  
1988 and 1998 
Males     
Education Level Public, 88 Public, 98 Private, 88* Private, 98 
Primary to R&W 5.27 7.03 1.20 0.37 
Prep. To Primary 13.83 12.00 6.40 4.00 
Sec. to Prep. 4.93 5.77 -1.57 2.70 
Univ. to Sec. 6.93 5.50 10.93 7.03 
 
Females     
Education Level Public, 88 Public, 98 Private, 88* Private, 98* 
Primary to R&W 9.53 18.90 5.90 12.80 
Prep. To Primary 17.10 11.23 2.73 4.27 
Sec. to Prep. 4.97 9.00 -7.53 -10.30 
Univ. to Sec. 7.13 5.75 28.68 32.25 
     
* Corresponds to insignificant coefficients.  
Shaded areas correspond to insignificant coefficients. 
Source: Authors' own calculations from LFSS 1988 and ELMS 1998. 
     
 
Table 3 also shows that a similar trend has been taking place in Morocco in the 
1990s. For Moroccan males with university education (vs. secondary) in public sector, 
returns dropped sharply in 10 years, from 26% to less than 5% in 1999. Private sector 
males also witnessed a drop in their returns at all levels of education between 1991 and 
1999. Although we notice the same result for females, their coefficients were 
insignificant to start with. Females in public sector with university degrees had a drop in 
their returns by only 1 percentage point. But overall, females in the public sector did fair 
better in 1999.  
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Table (3): % Differences in Rates of Return to Education By Sector of Employment, 
Morocco 1991 and 1999 
Males      
Education Level Public, 91 Public, 99 Private, 91* Private, 99  
Primary to R&W 14.60 4.87 6.60 0.83  
Prep. To Primary 10.97 10.00 8.50 11.80  
Sec. to Prep. 9.37 8.97 22.43 19.20  
Univ. to Sec. 25.85 4.93 25.08 8.58  
      
      
Females      
Education Level Public, 91 Public, 99 Private, 91* Private, 99*  
Primary to R&W 12.70 18.13 8.80 10.10  
Prep. To Primary 12.17 13.53 23.20 19.90  
Sec. to Prep. 1.87 4.77 1.57 13.13  
Univ. to Sec. 14.18 13.13 25.75 0.58  
      
* Corresponds to insignificant coefficients.   
Shaded areas correspond to insignificant coefficients.   
Source: Authors' own calculations from1991 and 1999 MLSMS, Morocco. 
      
 
Finally, we look at the effect of macro policies on wage inequality. We follow the 
literature by applying Oaxaca-Blinder wages differentials model and using the same 
methodology to sort out the differences in wages between public and private (and male-
female) sectors that are due to endowments and those that are due to discrimination, i.e. 
the explained from the unexplained. We grouped differences due to discrimination and 
differences due to selection bias in one ―unexplained‖ factor. 
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               Table (4):Wage Decomposition for Egypt and Morocco: Public vs. Private; Males vs. Females  
 
  Raw Diff. %Explained %Unexplained Adjusted  
  in logs Endowments Discrimination  Gap (%) 
Egypt         
Males, Public-Private Wage Differentials (1998) 0.06 52 48 3 
Females, Public-Private Wage Differentials 
(1998) 0.20 20 80 16 
Public (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1998) 0.04 19 81 3 
Private (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1998) 0.17 30 70 12 
Males, Public-Private Wage Differentials (1988) 0.15 55 44 7 
Females, Public-Private Wage Differentials 
(1988) 0.52 67 33 17 
Public (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1988) 0.09 14 86 8 
Private (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1988) 0.46 15 85 39 
 Morocco         
Males, Public-Private Wage Differentials (1999) 1.13 49 51 58 
Females, Public-Private Wage Differentials 
(1999) 1.62 50 50 81 
Public (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1999) 0.08 27 73 6 
Private (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1999) 0.58 28 72 42 
Males, Public-Private Wage Differentials (1991) 1.10 70 30 33 
Females, Public-Private Wage Differentials 
(1991) 1.29 89 11 14 
Public (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1991) 0.05 30 70 3 
Private (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1991) 0.24 18 82 20 
 
Source: Authors' own calculations from LFSS 1988 and ELMS 1998, and from1991 and 1999 
MLSMS, Morocco. 
 
 
 
Table (4) presents decompositions for gender and sector wage gaps for Egypt and 
Morocco which separate the justifiable or fair (i.e. explained) and unjustifiable or unfair 
(i.e. unexplained or discrimination) components.  For Egypt, male public sector wage 
premium declined from 7% in 1988 to 3% 1998; whereas female wages remaind almost 
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the same at 16-17 %. In other words, by the end of the decade, the public sector remained 
just as attractive for females, but lost a bit of its attraction, at least in terms of wage 
premiums for men. In term of the adjusted gender wage gaps, they appear to have 
declined in both the public sector (from 8 to 3%) and private sector (from 39% to 12%). 
Overall, wage inequality by education and gender appears to have declined substantially 
in Egypt during that decade of pursuing economic liberalization policies.
9
  
By contrast, all changes in public sector premiums and unexplained wage gaps in 
Morocco appear to be in the opposite direction. Male premiums in the public sector 
increased from 33% in 1991 to 58%, so did female premiums, which dramatically 
jumped from 14% in 1991 to 81% in 1999. An obvious explanation for the latter result is 
that the private sector in Morocco became much more discriminating in  wage payments 
to women. This suspicion is confirmed by the results on gender wage differentials, also 
presented in the same table that show the unexplained component attributable to gender-
based discrimination has doubled between 1991 and 1999, reaching, still, a modest 6 % 
in the public sector and 42% in the private sector – which is high by international 
standards. Overall, and in contrast to what happened in Egypt, the nineties appear to be a 
decade of increasing wage inequality by gender and education in Morocco.  
 
                                                 
9 When comparing the gender gap along public and private lines, we reached a different 
picture than the previous research (World Bank, 2004). That is, the adjusted private 
sector gender wage differences have also dropped in 1998. One immediate explanation, 
would be correcting for selectivity which was not preformed in the previous research. 
Other interpretations/ securitization are in process. 
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IV Conclusion 
Since the early 1990s, most countries in the MENA region started a new 
development model that aims to rely mostly on a growing export oriented, and privately 
held economy to achieve higher rates of growth. This chapter explores some of the equity 
implications of this transition by examining changes in the distribution of returns to 
education and gender wage premia in the Egyptian and Moroccan labor market in the 
1990s. This is accomplished by estimating joint models of educational choice and wage 
determination for both countries yielding selectivity corrected returns to different levels 
of education, from which a crude estimate of the private rate of return is calculated.  
 In line with theoretical expectation, as in MENA centralized wage setting in the 
public sector resulted in high rewards to educational credentials regardless of their link to 
productivity
10
, a reduction in the role of the public sector leads to lower returns in the 
private sector and falling returns over time. Only at the university level, are returns higher 
in the private sector in Egypt indicating that employers place relatively little value on 
basic and secondary education. In Morocco there is some evidence of higher returns in 
the private sector by the end of the 1990, which might be indicative of better matching of 
educational credentials and productivity differences. These results, however, need to be 
interpreted with care, especially for females, due to insignificant estimates associated 
with small sample size. Overall, returns to education results indicate clear wage 
compression for all sectors in Egypt, and for some, but not all groups in Morocco.  
                                                 
10 Public sector wage setting followed a fixed salary for each certificate and a regular 
raise according to seniority (not performance, productivity or skill), with lower and upper 
limits for each occupational grade. 
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 However, as indicted in the introduction, a reduction in educational premia does 
not necessarily mean that wage inequality is reduced, as wage inequality along other 
dimensions, such as gender and sector might increase. Oaxaca-Blinder wages-
differentials decompositions of sector and gender wage gap for Egypt and Morocco 
indicate the unexplained component in public wage premia and gender gaps have 
declined in Egypt, but substantially increased in Morocco over the 1990s. Overall, 
economic liberalization and public sector retrenchment which were much more 
comprehensive in Morocco appear to have had a more dislocating effect also on labor 
market wage outcomes. 
Possible policy implications for the results in this paper are in the three areas of 
educational reform, civil service reform and improving access of women to private sector 
jobs. First, the evidence on rates of return suggests that, at least in terms of education, 
public sector wage setting practices leads to wage contraction over time in an effort to 
protect lower strata wage earners from inflation.  Yet by rewarding educational 
credentials in public employment with higher wages, governments have encouraged 
investment in types of human capital that are not necessarily valued in the private sector.  
The problem is most acute in primary and secondary education, which has experienced 
significant expansion in the region to accommodate growing numbers of enrollees, often 
at the expense of quality. There is need to re-focus efforts on quality improvements and 
greater responsiveness to the needs of the private sector. In particular, the reform of 
vocational secondary and higher institute technical education systems in MENA should 
remain quite high on the policy agenda. 
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Second,  the notion that a large premium for public sector employees can persist 
suggests that markets are not performing appropriately or that the public sector remains a 
model employer that does not discriminate against employees, this is backed up by the 
results on discrimination reported above. Hence efforts to downsize and reform public 
sector pay systems in MENA should not necessarily take the private sector wage as the 
efficient benchmark. There is a need to conduct deeper inequality analysis and study in 
more detail the internal labor market within the public sector. At the very least, a 
differentiation between the government and state-owned enterprises should be 
introduced.  
Finally, given the favorable treatment of women in the government in MENA 
compared to the private sector and the lower levels of discrimination there, it is likely that 
the burden of privatization and civil service downsizing may fall disproportionately on 
women and may negatively affect the already low participation rates, unless effort is 
made to reduce the extent of gender-based discrimination in the private sector. 
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Appendix  
Figure (A-1) 
Earnings Distribution of All Workers
Egypt 1988
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Figure (A-2) 
 
Earnings Distribution of All Workers 
Egypt 1998
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Figure (A-3) 
 
Earnings Distribution of All Workers 
Morocco 1991
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Figure (A-4) 
Earnings Distribution of All Workers 
Morocco 1999
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Table (A-1)Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the 
Analysis 
 
       
1- Public Sector Males, 
1998, Egypt 
  2- Public Sector Females, 1998, Egypt 
No. of Observations= 1307   No. of Observations= 636  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 0.369 0.646  Log Real Wage 0.356 0.656 
Urban 0.706 0.456  Urban 0.848 0.360 
Experience 23.550 11.423  Experience 18.349 9.805 
Experience Sq. 6.850 5.649  Experience Sq. 4.327 4.021 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000  Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.090 0.286  Read&Write 0.007 0.086 
Primary 0.151 0.358  Primary 0.029 0.169 
Preparatory 0.291 0.454  Preparatory 0.397 0.490 
Secondary 0.105 0.307  Secondary 0.177 0.382 
University+ 0.287 0.452  University+ 0.370 0.483 
M. Illiterate 0.208 0.406  M. Illiterate 0.363 0.481 
F. Read&Write 0.388 0.487  F. Read&Write 0.407 0.492 
F.Primary 0.037 0.188  F.Primary 0.063 0.244 
F. Secondary 0.020 0.139  F. Secondary 0.027 0.163 
F. University 0.045 0.208  F. University 0.095 0.293 
Sibling 0-6 
Years 
0.819 1.033  Sibling 0-6 
Years 
0.585 0.844 
Sibling >6 
Years 
3.826 2.313  Sibling >6 Years 3.173 1.795 
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3- Private Sector Males, 1998, Egypt  4- Private Sector Females, 1998, Egypt 
No. of Observations= 745   No. of Observations= 78  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 0.223 0.646  Log Real Wage -0.048 0.902 
Urban 0.631 0.483  Urban 0.775 0.419 
Experience 16.958 12.146  Experience 12.030 11.326 
Experience Sq. 4.350 5.511  Experience Sq. 2.724 4.446 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000  Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.122 0.328  Read&Write 0.044 0.206 
Primary 0.249 0.433  Primary 0.113 0.317 
Preparatory 0.240 0.427  Preparatory 0.289 0.455 
Secondary 0.036 0.186  Secondary 0.074 0.262 
University+ 0.086 0.280  University+ 0.235 0.425 
M. Illiterate 0.156 0.363  M. Illiterate 0.301 0.462 
F. Read&Write 0.300 0.458  F. Read&Write 0.309 0.464 
F.Primary 0.024 0.153  F.Primary 0.018 0.134 
F. Secondary 0.006 0.080  F. Secondary 0.018 0.134 
F. University 0.025 0.156  F. University 0.064 0.245 
Sibling 0-6 
Years 
0.821 1.077  Sibling 0-6 
Years 
0.642 0.907 
Sibling >6 
Years 
4.349 2.497  Sibling >6 Years 3.995 2.180 
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5- Public Sector Males, 
1988, Egypt 
  6- Public Sector Females, 1988, Egypt 
No. of Observations= 1689   No. of Observations= 589  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 0.628 0.658  Log Real Wage 0.536 0.657 
Urban 0.677 0.468  Urban 0.845 0.362 
Experience 23.011 12.008  Experience 13.697 8.906 
Experience Sq. 6.736 6.156  Experience Sq. 2.668 3.381 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000  Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.187 0.390  Read&Write 0.013 0.115 
Primary 0.125 0.331  Primary 0.039 0.193 
Preparatory 0.244 0.430  Preparatory 0.466 0.499 
Secondary 0.066 0.248  Secondary 0.148 0.356 
University+ 0.232 0.422  University+ 0.291 0.455 
M. Illiterate 0.150 0.357  M. Illiterate 0.367 0.482 
F. Read&Write 0.348 0.477  F. Read&Write 0.438 0.497 
F.Primary 0.070 0.256  F.Primary 0.094 0.293 
F. Secondary 0.009 0.093  F. Secondary 0.025 0.157 
F. University 0.039 0.193  F. University 0.084 0.278 
Sibling 0-6 
Years 
1.121 1.326  Sibling 0-6 
Years 
0.774 1.034 
Sibling >6 
Years 
4.028 2.642  Sibling >6 Years 3.258 2.098 
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7- Private Sector Males, 1988, Egypt  8- Private Sector Females, 1988, Egypt 
No. of Observations= 1595   No. of Observations= 254  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 0.484 0.703  Log Real Wage 0.044 0.779 
Urban 0.590 0.492  Urban 0.627 0.484 
Experience 15.379 12.516  Experience 13.220 11.235 
Experience Sq. 3.931 5.675  Experience Sq. 3.005 4.741 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000  Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.167 0.373  Read&Write 0.043 0.203 
Primary 0.207 0.405  Primary 0.097 0.296 
Preparatory 0.149 0.357  Preparatory 0.233 0.423 
Secondary 0.021 0.143  Secondary 0.032 0.177 
University+ 0.055 0.228  University+ 0.118 0.324 
M. Illiterate 0.117 0.321  M. Illiterate 0.204 0.404 
F. Read&Write 0.262 0.440  F. Read&Write 0.216 0.412 
F.Primary 0.052 0.222  F.Primary 0.098 0.298 
F. Secondary 0.006 0.075  F. Secondary 0.008 0.088 
F. University 0.020 0.140  F. University 0.063 0.243 
Sibling 0-6 
Years 
1.145 1.420  Sibling 0-6 
Years 
0.832 1.068 
Sibling >6 
Years 
4.549 2.791  Sibling >6 Years 3.910 2.235 
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9- Public Sector Males, 1999, Morocco  10- Public Sector Females, 1999, M 
orocco 
No. of Observations= 434   No. of Observations= 147  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 2.640 0.695  Log Real Wage 2.553 0.703 
Experience 28.597 9.188  Experience 26.800 7.754 
Experience Sq. 9.020 5.495  Experience Sq. 7.781 4.386 
Urban 0.894 0.308  Urban 0.990 0.099 
Illiterate 0.296 0.457  Illiterate 0.185 0.390 
Read&Write 0.125 0.331  Read&Write 0.059 0.235 
Primary 0.174 0.380  Primary 0.073 0.261 
Preparatory 0.223 0.416  Preparatory 0.322 0.468 
Secondary 0.165 0.372  Secondary 0.210 0.408 
University+ 0.142 0.349  University+ 0.210 0.408 
M. Illiterate 0.031 0.173  M. Illiterate 0.105 0.308 
F. Read&Write 0.679 0.467  F. Read&Write 0.512 0.501 
F.Primary 0.220 0.415  F.Primary 0.227 0.420 
F. Preparatory 0.067 0.251  F. Preparatory 0.151 0.359 
F. Secondary 0.016 0.125  F. Secondary 0.070 0.255 
F. University 0.012 0.109  F. University 0.023 0.151 
Sibling 0-6 
Years 
0.891 1.042  Sibling 0-6 
Years 
0.634 0.856 
Sibling >6 
Years 
5.245 2.483  Sibling >6 Years 5.068 2.293 
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11- Private Sector Males, 1999, 
Morocco 
 12- Private Sector Females, 1999, 
Morocco 
No. of Observations= 1055   No. of Observations= 379  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 1.354 1.079  Log Real Wage 1.050 1.111 
Experience 20.364 11.783  Experience 18.022 10.890 
Experience Sq. 5.535 5.807  Experience Sq. 4.432 5.007 
Urban 0.608 0.488  Urban 0.827 0.379 
Illiterate 0.713 0.452  Illiterate 0.699 0.459 
Read&Write 0.304 0.460  Read&Write 0.217 0.412 
Primary 0.184 0.388  Primary 0.158 0.365 
Preparatory 0.063 0.242  Preparatory 0.092 0.289 
Secondary 0.026 0.159  Secondary 0.031 0.172 
University+ 0.014 0.118  University+ 0.020 0.141 
M. Illiterate 0.021 0.144  M. Illiterate 0.029 0.169 
F. Read&Write 0.778 0.416  F. Read&Write 0.754 0.431 
F.Primary 0.130 0.337  F.Primary 0.125 0.331 
F. Preparatory 0.057 0.231  F. Preparatory 0.077 0.267 
F. Secondary 0.014 0.116  F. Secondary 0.008 0.089 
F. University 0.010 0.097  F. University 0.012 0.109 
Sibling 0-6 
Years 
0.890 1.033  Sibling 0-6 
Years 
0.629 0.927 
Sibling >6 
Years 
6.088 2.602  Sibling >6 Years 5.736 2.546 
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13- Public Sector Males, 1991, 
Morocco 
 14- Public Sector Females, 1991, 
Morocco 
No. of Observations= 376   No. of Observations= 109  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage -1.243 1.011  Log Real Wage -1.374 1.017 
Urban 0.854 0.353  Urban 0.942 0.235 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000  Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.139 0.346  Read&Write 0.051 0.220 
Primary 0.184 0.388  Primary 0.145 0.353 
Preparatory 0.177 0.382  Preparatory 0.203 0.404 
Secondary 0.168 0.374  Secondary 0.312 0.465 
University+ 0.146 0.353  University+ 0.145 0.353 
M. Illiterate 0.005 0.070  M. Illiterate 0.031 0.174 
F. Read&Write 0.821 0.384  F. Read&Write 0.780 0.416 
F.Primary 0.150 0.358  F.Primary 0.119 0.326 
F. Preparatory 0.018 0.132  F. Preparatory 0.064 0.246 
F. Secondary 0.002 0.047  F. Secondary 0.018 0.135 
F. University 0.004 0.066  F. University 0.018 0.135 
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15- Private Sector Males, 1991, 
Morocco 
 16- Private Sector Females, 1991, 
Morocco 
No. of Observations= 660   No. of Observations= 154  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage -2.412 0.836  Log Real Wage -2.684 0.950 
Urban 0.486 0.500  Urban 0.728 0.446 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000  Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.271 0.445  Read&Write 0.168 0.374 
Primary 0.132 0.339  Primary 0.052 0.223 
Preparatory 0.046 0.210  Preparatory 0.071 0.257 
Secondary 0.037 0.188  Secondary 0.056 0.230 
University+ 0.011 0.105  University+ 0.026 0.160 
M. Illiterate 0.013 0.114  M. Illiterate 0.021 0.143 
F. Read&Write 0.838 0.369  F. Read&Write 0.799 0.402 
F.Primary 0.112 0.316  F.Primary 0.143 0.351 
F. Preparatory 0.033 0.180  F. Preparatory 0.032 0.178 
F. Secondary 0.009 0.095  F. Secondary 0.026 0.160 
F. University 0.005 0.067  F. University 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
